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BOOK REVIEW
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE
ELLEN S. PODGOR*
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: ACTIVIST
WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS.
By Donald E. Lively.
Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1990.
Pp. vii, 154. $25.95.
Congressional approval for those nominated by the President
to the United States Supreme Court has become a philosophical
expedition with senators attempting to discern the biases of those
who seek to assume the bench. For Robert Bork, such scrutiny
proved fatal to his candidacy; while for Anthony Kennedy,
Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter, the pas-
sage, albeit controversial, proved successful. Although talk of judi-
cial activism continues to elicit criticism and fear, it merely reflects
a perspective permeating the work of the United States Supreme
Court since shortly after its inception.1
Professor Donald Lively, in his newest book, Judicial Review
and the Consent of the Governed, dissects the activism of the
Court from an historical as well as a philosophical perspective. He
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.S. 1973, Syra-
cuse University; J.D. 1976, Indiana University (Indianapolis); M.B.A. 1987, University of
Chicago; LL.M. 1989, Temple University. I wish to thank Professor Donald E. Lively of the
University of Toledo College of Law for providing this impressive work to review.
' See D. LIvELY, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE CONSENT OF THE GovERNED: ACTIVIST WAYS
AND POPULAR ENDS 8-9 (1990) [hereinafter LwELY, JuDicL REvIEw]. The negative percep-
tion and fear of judicial activism stem from "the role of an unelected judiciary in reviewing,
and sometimes invalidating popular law." Id. Or, more vividly, an activist judiciary is one
that "[cuts] law from its own cloth with only token advertence to the [C]onstitution." Id. at
10.
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criticizes those who presume. to speak authoritatively from the
Constitution's text as if having knowledge of the framers' true in-
tent and the essential nature of this purported scripture.
The Court's interpretive function, articulated by Chief Justice
John Marshall in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison,2 lends
credence to the premise that activism is inherent to the judicial
process.3 Professor Lively describes the role of activism as ranging
from the Court's passive declination of review of cases to its actual
acceptance and interpretation using the Constitution.4 Lively dis-
counts conservative rhetoric that accuses judicial activism of ex-
ceeding simple interpretation of the Constitution. He notes that
the "open-ended terminology" of the constitutional guarantees
renders this impossible,5 and further argues that the framers "in-
scribed an invitation for activist vitalization." 6
Lively begins his discourse by proposing that activism, a mis-
understood term, is at the heart of any expounding or application
of the law. 7 In a subsidiary proposition, Lively explains that popu-
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 See LIvELY, JUDIcIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 37-39. Chief Justice John Marshall
established the Constitution as paramount law and the Supreme Court as its sole inter-
preter. Id. Although facially a political dispute concerning the validity of a Federalist court-
packing scheme, Chief Justice Marshall shrewdly allowed the interests of his party, the Fed-
eralists, to be sacrificed for the long-term, vastly superior, gain of judicial supremacy. Id. at
38. Professor Lively points out that judicial power, as delineated by Marshall, "constituted
not merely a definition but veritable seizure of authority," since Marshall did not refer to
original intent in his opinion. Id.
4 See id. at 17. According to Lively, so-called judicial restraint and activism are, practi-
cally speaking, not as analytically divergent as might first appear, since both "can have
profound political and constitutional consequences." Id. For example, a "constrained" inter-
pretation of the equal protection clause led to the separate but equal doctrine, whereas a
"more overtly activist" reading led to desegregation orders. Id. Thus, the Court actively
decides a constitutional principle each time it hears an argument, regardless of whether the
principle is upheld or overturned: "Even complete passiveness ... can represent activism
that is subjectively motivated." Id.
Id. at 14.
e Id. at 28. Professor Lively lambastes the "self-proclaimed exponents of restraint
[who] advocate interpretation of the [Clonstitution as written or insist upon what its cre-
ators clearly intended." Id. Characterizing any attempt at deciphering original intent as "a
largely vain assignment," Lively discredits the attempt to create any guiding purpose from
largely confidential convention proceedings, and plausible but divergent understandings of
original opinion and purpose. Moreover, the elasticity of the constitutional language reflects
the time's adherence to a philosophy of "natural rights," believed to have been derived from
God and therefore antedating state-given rights. See id.
I Id. at 8. Because "[a]ctivism wears a variety of faces," much of the misunderstanding
and fears engendered by the term "activism" arise from a confusion of terminology. Id. at 9.
Activism is equally present when the Court preempts state action because of federal law as
well as when, more controversially, "the judiciary attempts to inject meaning into text that
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lar inclinations affect the sensitivities of the Court and result in an
exercise of power along majoritarian lines.8
An entire chapter discusses the father of constitutional law,
John Marshall, whose arrogation of power to the Court was
"unashamedly activist."" Like Marshall, Justices regularly engage
in activism in interpreting the Constitution. Professor Lively dis-
tinguishes Justice Marshall's position from his successors because
"Marshall wrote on virtually a clean slate" while the others were
often bound by precedent. 10 For all Justices, however, Lively sees
the Bill of Rights as a textual starting point from which substan-
tive meaning evolves.
Professor Lively openly criticizes those who focus upon intent
because they discount or disregard how subsequent experience may
alter original expectations or contemplation." He likewise finds
verbal sophistry in the claim that "the [C]onstitution is speaking
for itself by means of penumbras, emanations or other internal de-
sign, rather than candidly acknowledging that the Court deter-
mines the document's message pursuant to the values imparted
and consequent drafting of principles."' 2
Professor Lively does not limit his analysis to a rendition of
forceful exhortations supporting his proposition. Rather, an entire
chapter considers the arguments against judicial activism. He thus
establishes the futility of strict literalism of the Constitution. The
equal protection doctrine demonstrates "how outside values will
shape constitutional law regardless of how the judicial function is
characterized."' 3 In addition, Professor Lively reduces the fear of
is not self-defining." Id. Much criticism of an active judiciary derives from a dissatisfaction
with its results. Id. at 14; see also infra note 20 (comment of Justice Souter before the
Senate Judiciary Committee).
8 See LELY, JUDIcIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 23. As examples of the Court's acquies-
cence to popular sentiment, Lively cites its endorsement of slavery in the separate but equal
doctrine, its reconciling "McCarthyism" to a proper reading of the first amendment, and its
curbing of busing as a remedy for segregation. Id.1 Id. at 38. Chief Justice Marshall's broad interpretation of "necessary and proper" in
the commerce clause and his "[d]eferential reading[] of congressional power to regulate
commerce" tended to consolidate power in a strong central government. See id. at 35. Mar-
shall's bold usurpation of power, however, starkly contrasted with the actions of his prede-
cessor, John Jay, who refused reappointment to the Court because it lacked authority. Id.
10 See id. at 35.
11 Id. at 39; see infra note 13 and accompanying text.
12 LIVELY, JuDIciAL REvIEw, supra note 1, at 32.
12 Id. at 68. A common theme running through Professor Lively's discourse is the inevi-
table impingement of external values on constitutional law. Id. passim. While noting that
criticism of outside influence usually comes from proponents of judicial restraint, Lively
1991]
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judicial legislation often associated with judicial activism, by dem-
onstrating how it is constrained by majoritarian forces: "Even if
cut from the Court's rather than the [C]onstitution's cloth, exter-
nally referenced principles of constitutional law reveal a distinctly
majoritarian weave posing little practical threat to democratic val-
ues." 14 Despite the influence of majoritarian societal pressures on
the Court, Lively strongly rejects "[r]aw public sentiment" as the
"exclusive determinant of constitutional principle."' 5 Even should
the Court miscalculate public sentiment, the legislature will be on
hand to "reclaim the lost ground." 6
Lively's discussion of judicial subjectivism includes an exten-
sive analysis of the Lochner1 decision. He explains the case as de-
cision making by "a judiciary with a distorted sense of the
[C]onstitution and itself."' 8 Rather than reflecting its time, Loch-
offers the counter-example of Ronald Reagan's campaign promise to appoint judges who
"respect family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." Id. at 68 (footnote omit-
ted). Lively asserts that review pegged to "family values as a basis for narrowing or elimi-
nating abortion rights" impedes their effectiveness elsewhere. Id. This "represents primarily
a framework for intellectual and political hypocrisy." Id. at 69. Lively similarly criticizes
those who eschew the influence of value on constitutional law, yet easily interpret the free-
dom of speech clause as excluding some types of expression: "A determination that street
vernacular is unfit for broadcast and thus constitutionally unprotected... reflects nothing
more than a choice of values unrelated to actual terms of the [C]onstitution." Id. at 116.
11 Id. at 98. For example, public reaction to the judicial treatment of abortion rights
modified the right of privacy. Id. Professor Lively believes that the public is "divided not so
much over the existence but the scope of the liberty," and that a more narrow delineation of
the right would remain "consonant with societal norms." Id. at 129. In Lively's view, public
opinion, on the whole, has remained supportive of abortion rights' "practicalities," despite
the opposition of a small minority. Id. at 128. "[T]he continuing epilogue to the abortion
decision actually demonstrates effectively how any judicial pronouncement is not necessarily
the final word but the beginning of an interaction among representative forces that ulti-
mately determines constitutional configuration." Id. at 129. Thus, although he eschews the
value of "raw public sentiment," Lively acknowledges the modifying role societal values can
exert on judicial enunciation of a constitutional principle. Id. at 128-29.
" Id. at 128. If majority rule were given full rein, Lively asserts that issues such as
"slavery, segregation and First Amendment freedoms could be decided by a plebiscite." Id.
at 129.
"I Id. at 109. The imposition of notification requirements and the prohibition against
public funding for abortions reflects the conformity of the legislature's narrowing of judi-
cially declared rights with societal values. Id.
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court elevated freedom of
contract between employer and employees over state regulation of bakers' working hours.
See id. at 61-64. As a prime example of result-oriented analysis, Lochner illustrates the
Court's failure to consider the inequality in bargaining power between the two parties. See
LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 108. Lively defines result-oriented analysis as the
"[u]nexpounded attachment of an exclusive label to an act or practice, when more than one
fits." Id.
11 LIVELY, JUDIcIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 113.
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ner exemplifies the "Court's lagging behind and even impairing the
effectuation of evolving societal values."'19
Professor Lively's book can serve as a framework for those
commencing a study of constitutional interpretation. It provides
structure to the unstructured and a semblance of process to theory
that is often garbled. This work, however, is more than a primer
for the law student; it is a text ready to educate those who under-
take the questions of the Senate Judiciary Committee. One can
only contrast Judge Bork's arrogant profession of true knowledge
of the constitutional scripture with Justice Souter's open admis-
sion that constitutional interpretation necessarily refers to the
text, the precedent, and the times.2 0 This substantially more realis-
tic approach enabled the latter to ascend to the Court and derail
the candidacy of the former.
Because Professor Lively's focus is more theoretical than prac-
tical in scope, he precludes neither conservative nor progressive
construction. Rather, he insists that whatever one's perspective,
one must acknowledge that construction does occur. Adherents of
either viewpoint can fortify their positions with a false reliance on
their supposed "true" knowledge of the document and its drafters'
underlying intent.
Although Judicial Review and the Consent of the Governed
provides a wealth of information on the structure of constitutional-
ism, the slim volume lacks an in-depth application of structure to
the vast number of existing decisions. For those who seek a review
of the many aspects of constitutional law, Lively's book will not
rise to meet the occasion.
Equally absent is a comprehensive consideration of the factors
19 Id. at 109. In constrast, the right of privacy attended to "societal values." Id. Lively
believes it "strikes a more positive chord" in a broad cross-section of the populace than do
contractual liberties. Lively distinguishes Lochner-type judicial activism from that of the
Warren Court: where Lochner esteemed freedom of the marketplace, the Warren Court
sought to enliven democratic principles. Id.
For example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), continues to garner
praises, while Lochner is reviled as an "aberration if not abomination." LIVELY, JUDICIAL
REVIEW, supra note 1, at 115.
10 See Lewis, Souter Comments in Approving Way on Activist Court, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice
Souter characterized a judicial activist as "someone who rules against you," stating that
courts occasionally "are forced to take on problems which sometimes might be better ad-
ressed by the political branches of government." Id. Justice Souter alarmed conservative
Senators when he termed the Miranda decision a "pragmatic experiment" rather than a
creation of "new rights for criminals." Id.
1991]
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that underlie the majority view. Although Professor Lively refers
to the influence of majoritarian values,2 economic scholars might
find that economic factors play an overriding role. Other theorists
might consider the American political structure to be the preemi-
nent force controlling the Court's views. His failure to analyze the
motivation behind majoritarianism does not, however, significantly
impair the insight of Lively's book.
Professor Lively's writing and vocabulary are akin to a melodi-
ous symphony with organization as well-composed as a work by
Mozart. It is refreshing to hear, in the constitutional theory of one
calling for intellectual honesty, a consistent authenticity. The ethi-
cal implications of acknowledging that external values affect judi-
cial interpretation may yet rectify the perceived lack of credibility
within the present legal system.
2 See LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 98.
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